In this paper we consider that relative position in queue is determined according to the size of a customer's bribe (which is paid before the customer sees the queue length). Such a policy allows the customer himself to affect his own queue position, rather than the classical approach of assuming that a customer is preassigned to some (possibly continuous) priority class. For the case of Poisson arrivals, arbitrary service time distribution, and arbitrary distribution of customer bribe, we obtain the average waiting time for customers as a function of their bribe. We consider both preemptive and nonpreemptive disciplines. Examples are presented for various bribing distributions, which demonstrate that many well-known priority queuing systems are special cases of this bribing situation. Furthermore, a cost function is defined after we introduce the notion of an impatience factor (which converts seconds of wait into dollars). Conditions for optimum bribing are then determined, where the optimization refers to minimizing the average cost subject to a mean bribe constraint. An example for exponential service and exponential bribing is carried out and the results are plotted. In these earlier studies, the relative priority given to any customer was completely out of his individual control; the customer, in effect, had no choice as to which priority group he must join.
A NUMBER of priority queuing disciplines
In this study, we shift the emphasis somewhat, and allow each entering unit to 'buy' his relative priority by means of a bribe. The size of the bribe will be determined, in general, from certain economic factors inherent in the population of customers; in particular, the greater the wealth of a customer, and the greater his dislike of waiting on queue, the greater will be his bribe.
THE MODELS
WE CONSIDER two models, the first of which is a nonpreemptive queuing model. We assume that we have Poisson arrivals at a mean rate of X customers per second. The single-channel service facility has an arbitrary cumulative service time distribution F(T) with a mean service time 1/,u sec. Let the customer's bribe, x, be a random variable with an arbitrary cumulative distribution function B(x). We assume that the arrival time, the service time, and the bribe are all independent random variables for each customer and are independent of the values chosen for all other customers.
The system operates as follows: A new arrival to the system offers a nonnegative bribe* x to the 'queue organizer.' This customer is then placed in position on the queue so that all those customers whose bribes x'I x are in front of him and all these with x" <x are behind him. Newly entering customers may therefore be placed in front of, or behind this customer, depending upon their bribe. Each time the service facility completes work on some customer (who then leaves the system), it then accepts into service the customer at the front of the queue. Once in service, a customer cannot be ejected until he is completely serviced.
In the preemptive case (our second model), we restrict ourselves to a service time distribution F( T) =1--e-T with a preemptive resume rule. In this mode, a customer will be ejected from service if a newly entering unit offers a bribe larger than the bribe he offered.
In both cases, we have X =average arrival rate of customers (Poisson distribution). 
where
Each such unit causes the tagged unit to wait an average time of l/gO sec. Equation (4) follows from the observation (see LITTLE121) that the expected number of units in a system is equal to the product of their arrival rate and the expected time they spend in the system. Furthermore, the tagged unit must wait until service is given to all those customers who enter the system while the tagged unit is on the queue and whose bribes exceed his. The expected number whose bribes lie in the interval (y, y+dy) and which arrive during his average wait W(x) is X(y) W(x) dy.
Each such unit adds 1/g sec to the tagged unit's average wait. Combining these three contributions to the tagged unit's average wait, we gett W() = wo+f X(y) (y) dy+dy Proof. The proof here is almost identical to that of Theorem 1. Instead of equation (7) 
The behavior at zero bribe should describe the waiting time for the lower priority group of a two-priority class head-of-the-line system where the arrival rate of this low priority group is negligible compared to the total arrival rate. Indeed, as can be seen from references 1 and 5, the equations above are consistent. When only a finite (countable) set of bribes are allowed (at the values Xk), then we have a discrete distribution that yields which establishes the required conservation relation.
OPTIMUM BRIBING
As SOON AS we introduce the notion of a bribe, we must then consider other cost factors as well. In particular, we define an impatience factor a( ?0) that measures how many dollars* it costs a customer for each second that he spends in the system. We may use one of two definitions of the system, i.e., the system may be defined as the queue alone or it may be defined as the queue plus the service facility. Considering first, the case of waiting time in queue, we define the cost function C(a) as C(a) -xa+aW(xa3), Thus, C(a) is the sum of the customer's bribe (in dollars) and his cost of waiting (in dollars). We assume that customers have (self-) assigned values of a before they enter the system, and that the population of customers, as a whole, produce a probability distribution P(a) on the random variable a, i.e., P(a) =Probability that an entering customer has an impatience factor a' <a.
The queuing models here are the same as those considered earlier where now, the bribe xa is some (deterministic) function of the random variable a. We have thus shifted emphasis from the situation in which a customer offers a random bribe to a situation where the customer's bribe is functionally related to his (random) impatience factor a. We pose the following optimization problem: Find that function, XC, which minimizes the expected cost C, i.e., For any given value of impatience factor, a, we can determine the cost C(oa) as in equation (29) 
This cost is plotted in Fig. 2 with a as a parameter (a =0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 , 15, 20) and for p=0.5. We plot C(a) versus x, taking the view that the bribe itself is the random variable. We observe in Fig. 2 , the occurrence of a minimum of C(a) at some x for each fixed a.
The optimum bribing procedure for this example is obtained as follows. First, we alter our point of view and consider a to be the random variable with x = xa a deterministic function of a. For example, let us take the form chosen in equation (42) It is interesting to note from equations (49) and (50) that the factor ln[l/(1-p)] appears in the average cost C; such a factor seems rather unusual in queuing problems.
CONCLUSION
IN THIS paper, an analysis has been carried out that views priority queuing as a customer bribing mechanism. The average waiting times were calculated for Poisson input and arbitrary service distributions, both with and without preemption. The notion of an 'impatience' factor was then introduced, which allowed a cost function to be defined. We found that the only condition necessary for an optimum (in the sense of minimizing the average cost subject to a mean bribe constraint) bribing function was that it be monotonically increasing with the impatience factor. It was shown that many well-known priority disciplines may be viewed as bribing mechanisms.
